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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of double tax treaties (DTTs) on foreign direct
investment (FDI) after controlling for their relevance in the presence of treaty shopping.
DTTs cannot be considered a bilateral issue, but must be viewed as a network, since
FDI can flow from home to host country through one or more conduit countries. By ac-
counting for treaty shopping, we calculate the shortest (i.e. the cheapest) tax distance
between any two countries allowing the corporate income to be channelled through
intermediate jurisdictions. We differentiate between relevant and neutral DTTs - i.e.
tax treaties that offer investors a financial advantage - and irrelevant DTTs and use
these data to derive two important results. First, only relevant and neutral tax treaties
increase bilateral FDI, whereas irrelevant DTTs do not. We can quantify the increase
of FDI due to a relvant DTT at around 22%. Second, significant tax reductions due
to treaty benefits will lead to an increase in FDI.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, double tax treaties (DTTs) served as an important policy tool to promote
international economic activity by preventing international double taxation. However,
despite the growing number of contributions, the empirical evidence on the effects of double
tax treaties on bilateral FDI remains inconclusive (Blonigen & Davies, 2004; Egger, Larch,
Pfaffermayr, & Winner, 2006; Neumayer, 2007; Egger & Merlo, 2011). The well intended
motivation to eliminate double taxation has created a highly complex network of DTTs
that span the globe, with often unforeseen consequences (Easson, 2000). While preventing
international double taxation, DTTs shift taxing rights from capital-importing countries to
capital-exporting countries, denying investors the benefits of lower source taxation (Braun
& Zagler, 2014). Moreover, in order to avoid high host country withholding taxes on
outgoing passive income, many multinational companies divert FDI via a third country
with a more favourable tax treaty, a practice that has been labeled treaty shopping in
the literature (OECD, 2015; Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, & Shackelford, 2015). The OECD
highlights that treaty shopping is one of the most significant sources of concerns regarding
the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. Against this background, this paper
investigates the effects of double tax treaties on foreign direct investment (FDI) controlling
for the possibility of treaty shopping that might give multinational companies benefits,
such as lower or no withholding taxes.
We follow the novel paper by Barrios et al. (2012) and interpret the international tax
system as a network where the tax distance between two countries is defined as the cost
of channelling corporate income from one country to another in terms of taxes to be paid.
In particular, the tax cost between two countries consists of corporate income taxes to be
paid in the host country, a non-resident withholding tax on the income of the subsidiary
and corporate income taxes in the home country. We account for treaty shopping and
calculate the shortest (i.e. the cheapest) distance between any two countries allowing for
corporate income to be channelled through one or more intermediate jurisdictions. Our
main hypothesis is that only relevant tax treaties - i.e. tax treaties that offer investors a
financial advantage over the conditions under domestic law, given the entire existing tax
treaties network - lead to more immediate home to host country FDI.
We indeed find that relevant and neutral DTTs increase FDI, whereas irrelevant DTTs
have no impact. We also find that significant tax reduction due to treaty benefits will lead
to an increase in FDI.
Our paper contributes to various strands of research. First, we advance the understand-
ing of the effects of DTTs on combined effective tax rates (Marques & Pinho, 2014). In this
regard, we calculate the benefit of every DTT on the combined effective tax rate relative
to the conditions under domestic law. Second, we advance the literature that adopts a
network approach to study the tax treaties network (Van’t Riet & Lejour, 2017; Hong,
2017). Here, we improve the methodology and, by allowing for tax treaty shopping poten-
tial, we estimate the minimum tax cost between any two countries in our sample. We then
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evaluate the benefit of every particular DTT relative to the minimum tax distance between
the two countries with the respective tax treaty. Third, we build on the work of Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2010), Dreßler (2012) and Weyzig (2013), and analyse the effects of DTTs
on FDI in the presence of treaty shopping. Overall, we advance the research on the effects
of DTTs on FDI through a rich analysis that accounts for their differential impact instead
of a simplified binary definition.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarises the existing
literature and identifies the research gap. In section 3 we discuss the theoretical back-
ground. In section 4 we discuss our sample and research methodology. We present our
results in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
The economic effects of DTTs have been analysed in numerous studies. Using OECD
data on the stocks and flows of bilateral aggregate FDI for the years 1982-1992, Bloni-
gen and Davies (2005) find that new tax treaties have a strong negative impact on FDI.
Blonigen and Davies (2004) confirm these results using US data. The authors attribute
their results to DTTs reducing tax evasion, at least in the short run. For a sample of
67 DTTs and aggregate bilateral outward FDI between OECD countries from 1985-2000,
Egger et al. (2006) find a negative average treatment effect of DTTs on FDI using dif-
ferent matching estimators and focusing on difference-in-differences. Baker (2014) uses a
similar estimation strategy, i.e. propensity score-matched difference-in-difference estima-
tion, and shows that tax treaties do not have any effect on FDI. Against all the results so
far mentioned, Neumayer (2007) finds robust empirical evidence that DTTs increase FDI
to developing countries. However, when the author splits developing countries into low-
income and middle-income countries, he finds that DTTs are effective only in the group of
middle-income countries.
Whereas studies using aggregate country- and country-pair-level data tend to find nega-
tive or statistically insignificant results, there is a tendency for studies based on micro-data
to find some positive effects of DTTs. For instance, Egger and Merlo (2011) argue that
DTTs have a positive effect on foreign investments of multinational firms using micro-data
on German multinational-firm activity over 1996-2005. Blonigen et al. (2014) use firm-level
data from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis on their activity in 174 countries
between 1987 and 2007. They find a positive effect of DTTs on foreign direct investment,
which is larger for firms that use differentiated inputs. These (multinational) firms ben-
efit from treaty provisions establishing guidelines for resolving disputes between taxation
authorities. In contrast, firms that use more homogenous inputs are on average less likely
to see any significant effect. This difference can be explained by the additional regulations
on the calculation of internal prices and encouraging the exchange of information between
authorities.
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A closely related stream of the literature considers the effects of DTTs on the location
decision of multinational firms. Using micro-data from Sweden between 1965-1998, Davies
et al. (2009) find a positive effect of DTTs on multinational firm’s decision to locate
the first affiliate in a treaty country. The authors argue that the positive effect of DTTs
comes from the reduced investment uncertainty. Marques and Pinho (2014) analyse the
extent to which tax treaties influence the number of new foreign subsidiaries incorporated
by European multinationals between 2000 and 2009. The authors use two measures for
tax treaties: a binary variable and an effective tax rate, which (similarly to the combined
effective tax rate used in this paper) captures the corporate tax rates of both host and home
countries, as well as tax-treaty features such as withholding tax rates and double taxation
relief methods. However, in contrast to our paper, the authors ignore the possibility of
treaty shopping and do not measure the impact of tax treaties relative to domestic law.
Prior literature offers several explanations for these ambiguous and inconclusive results.
As argued by Owens (1962), and later pointed out by Davies (2004) and Baker (2014), for
given tax rates, double taxation can be relieved just as easily unilaterally as through a
bilateral tax treaty. In particular, since most capital exporting countries already offer tax
credits or exemptions, treaties have only a very limited role in avoiding double taxation.
More generally, Bo¨senberg, Egger and Erhardt (2016) suggest that the impact of DTTs
depends on their content (e.g. which method of double tax relief is specified in a treaty
or whether a treaty includes provisions on exchange of information) and the economic
environment in which they occur (e.g. the profitability of bilateral multinational activity
in absence of a treaty; the domestic corporate and withholding tax rates; and the unilateral
method of double taxation relief). Meanwhile, the vast majority of the existing literature
treats DTTs as a binary variable, thereby ignoring their complexity and their domestic
and international interactions. To our knowledge, only Marques and Pinho (2014) analyse
the effect of DTTs on the combined effective tax rates.
Our study addresses this gap in the literature and analyses the effects of double tax
treaties in a richer setting that goes beyond their binary treatment. Relying on the work
of Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010), Dreßler (2012) and Weyzig (2013), we treat the inter-
national tax system as a network and subsequently account for treaty shopping potential
when estimating the effects of DTTs on FDI. In order to avoid high host country with-
holding taxes on outgoing passive income, many multinational companies divert FDI via
a third country with a more favourable tax treaty. If a country has several tax treaties,
MNEs will take advantage of the “worst” one - i.e. the most favourable one from the firm’s
perspective - structuring their investment via the cheapest route (Brumby & Keen, 2016).
It is plausible that DTTs have a different effect on investment depending on whether in-
vestors consider the direct route as a viable investment channel. Therefore, in contrast to
the previous literature, instead of treating tax treaties as a binary variable, we evaluate
their relevance given the entire tax treaties network and allow for a differential effect on
FDI. We do not concentrate on a single country or a single year, but conduct our analysis
using a panel with more than 140 countries and their corresponding tax treaties network
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between 2005 and 2012 allowing for sufficient variation under domestic law and in the tax
treaties network. Finally, in contrast to the previous literature that takes into account only
the world average corporate income tax as the rate to be credited in conduit situations,
we do not use such approximations. Instead, we consider the actual taxes paid on route.
By doing so, we are able to measure the impact of DTTs on combined effective tax rates
given the entire tax treaties network and estimate the corresponding effect on FDI.
3 Theoretical background
We build on the work of Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010), Dreßler (2012) and Weyzig (2013)
consider the international tax system as a network and account for treaty shopping potential
when estimating the impact of DTTs on FDI. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) construct
the chains of corporate structure for German multinationals across various countries for
the year 2001 and relate these structures to the underlying fiscal motives. The level of
withholding taxes is found to be important in determining which countries are used as a
platform for investments. More specifically, higher bilateral withholding taxes to and from
Germany substantially increase the probability that outward and inward FDI is diverted
via a third country.
Dreßler (2012) traces the group structures of multinationals across 58 countries in
the years 1996 to 2008 and analyses to what extent these structures are tax-efficient.
In this case, the level of withholding taxes between two group members is found to be
important in determining the probability of an indirect participation. Holding companies
are generally established in jurisdictions where they can, at least potentially, lower the
applicable withholding taxes. Accordingly, operative subsidiaries are likely to be held via
intermediate companies located in jurisdictions with low withholding tax rates towards the
country of the ultimate parent. However, in about half of the observations, the intermediate
conduit company does not lower the overall tax burden and in about 5% of the cases the
tax burden on such repatriated profits is actually higher.
Finally, Weyzig (2013) uses micro-data from Dutch Special Purpose Entities to analyse
the geographical patterns and the structural determinants of FDI diversion. The results
confirm that tax treaties are a key determinant of FDI routed through the Netherlands.
In particular, the effect of tax treaties on FDI diversion partly arises from the reduction of
dividend withholding tax rates, which provides evidence for tax treaty shopping.
Following Barrios et al. (2012), we capture the features of the international tax system
by measuring the tax distance between two countries, where tax distance is defined as the
cost of channelling corporate income from one to another in terms of taxes to be paid. In
particular, the tax cost between two countries consists of corporate income taxes to be paid
in the host country, non-resident withholding taxes on the income of the subsidiary and
corporate income taxes in the home country. The combined effective tax rate teSP (rmSP )
for the multinational company can be determined depending on the relief method applied
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in the home (parent) country P on income from host (subsidiary) country S:
teSP (no relief) = tS + wSP − tSwSP + tP − tStP (1)
teSP (deduction) = 1− (1− tS)(1− wSP )(1− tP ) (2)
teSP (direct credit) = max{1− (1− tS)(1− wSP ), 1− (1− tS)(1− tP )} (3)
teSP (indirect credit) = max{1− (1− tS)(1− wSP ), tP } (4)
teSP (exemption) = 1− (1− tS)(1− wSP ) (5)
where (rmSP ) is the applicable relief method, tS the corporate tax rate in the host country,
tP the corporate tax rate in the home country and wSP the non-resident withholding tax
on the income of the subsidiary.
About half of the countries in our sample operate an exemption system under which
foreign dividends are not taxed in the home country (5).1 Other countries subject the
received dividends to home country taxation at the corporate tax rate tP . Most of these
countries avoid double taxation by crediting the taxes paid in the host jurisdiction on the
amount of distributed dividends (3). Such credit is usually limited to corporate taxes due
in the home country. In some cases, also an indirect credit for the underlying corporate
taxes is offered (4). Alternatively, a small number of countries does not exempt, nor credit
foreign taxes, but instead allows them to be deducted as a business expense (2). Finally,
some (especially less developed) countries do not provide for any form of double tax relief
(1). The received dividends are then subject to full double taxation.
Next, we consider the possibility of an indirect repatriation of dividends, i.e. through
a third (conduit) country C. It is rational for the MNE to choose the indirect route
over the direct route, ceteris paribus, when its costs in terms of taxes are lower (Mintz
& Weichenrieder, 2010; Weyzig, 2013; Van’t Riet & Lejour, 2017). Since the corporate
income tax of the host country tS is always paid, irrespective of the relief method, we can
define the direct tax distance deSP between host country S and home country P based only
on the relevant withholding tax rate and the corporate income tax of the home country.
Depending on the relief method, the combined effective tax rate teSP can be then defined as
1− (1− tS)(1−deSP ), where deSP accounts for the tax “distance” between the two countries
measured in taxes paid en route:
deSP (no relief) = tP + wSP (6)
deSP (deduction) = 1− (1− wSP )(1− tP ) (7)
1This includes states that operate a territorial tax system where all foreign profits are exempt and states
that adopt worldwide taxation with a participation exemption for foreign dividends. Some countries exempt
only 95% of the received dividends with, typically, a foreign tax credit or no relief for the remaining 5% of
the dividends. Other countries exempt 100% of the received dividends, but disallow the deduction of certain
costs connected with the participation. To simplify the analysis, we ignore these distinct characteristics.
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deSP (direct credit) = max{wSP , tP } (8)
deSP (indirect credit) = max{wSP ,
tP − tS
1− tS } (9)
deSP (exemption) = wSP (10)
It follows that the condition for treaty shopping is that total taxes over the indirect
route are less than over the direct one, i.e. 1− (1− dSC)(1− dCP ) < dSP where the total
tax distance with an initial host k = 1 and final destination k = n equals 1−
n∑
k=2
(1−dk−1,k)
(Van’t Riet & Lejour, 2017).
Finally, in a one-period model, where all profits are repatriated, it can be shown theoret-
ically that FDI is decreasing in the relative effective tax rate T where 1−T = (1−te)/(1−t),
with te being the effective tax rate on overseas profits and t the effective tax rate on do-
mestic profits (Davies, 2003, 2004). In this model, DTTs increase FDI only to the extent
that they reduce the relative effective tax rate. However, accounting for the possibility of
an indirect repatriation of dividends, the effective tax rate on overseas profits is the lower
one between the one on a direct route and the one on the indirect route. Accordingly, we
differentiate between relevant tax treaties that offer investors a financial advantage over the
conditions under domestic law, given the entire tax treaties network; neutral tax treaties
that cut the tax cost of the direct route to the minimum one in the network; and irrelevant
tax treaties that do not provide investors with a financial benefit.2
We expect relevant tax treaties to have a positive impact on the immediate FDI from
the home country to the host country. If there are non-negligible non-tax costs to treaty
shopping, neutral tax treaties may have a positive impact as well. We expect irrelevant
tax treaties to have no impact on the immediate home to host country FDI.
4 Data and network analysis
4.1 Data
In order to construct our network analysis, we collect tax data for a sample of 146 countries
between the years 2005 and 2012.3 Our main source of data on domestic and international
2This model and the corresponding measure of tax distance focus only on dividend income and thereby
ignore the potential for rate shopping where firms distribute profits in the way of interest or royalty payments
to benefit from lower withholding tax rates on these types of passive income. Leaving aside the legal
arguments, if and to what extent one type of passive income can be transformed into another one, we
observe that for tax treaties that became effective in the years 2005-2012, average dividend withholding tax
rates are the lowest and less than 10% tax DTTs have a lower withholding tax rate on interest or royalty
income. To the extent that firms do “rate shop”, we are less likely to find significant results for the impact
of DTTs on FDI, when focusing only on dividend income.
3We are limited to this time span, as domestic tax data are not available systematically for the years
before 2005, whereas data on FDI are not yet available for the years after 2012.
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tax system are the IBFD Global Corporate Tax Handbooks for the years 2009-2012 and
IBFD Online Tax Platform. For the countries included in the Global Corporate Tax Hand-
books we collect information on the domestic tax system and, in particular, on taxation of
foreign income (including the methods of double tax relief), and domestic corporate and
withholding tax rates from the respective year books. To the extent that a country is not
available in a Global Corporate Tax Handbook, we consult the closest to the missing year
source of data for the taxation of foreign income, including the IBFD Online Tax Platform,
and, unless indicated otherwise, assume the same method of taxation of foreign income for
the missing years.
Moreover, we update all domestic corporate and withholding tax rates with the EY
(Ernst and Young) Corporate Tax Guides if the IBFD data are not available for a particular
year. For instance, for the years 2005-2008, the EY Corporate Tax Guides are our only
source of data on domestic corporate and withholding tax rates. We further hand-collect
the relevant withholding tax rates and methods of double tax relief from the respective
DTTs and applicable protocols. Also, as the treaties network is subject to four types of
changes, we check when new treaties become effective; if treaties have been terminated at
a later point in time; if the conditions of the treaties have been changed through protocols
in the following years; and if the conditions of the treaties have been altered through
amendments in domestic law.4 Overall, we consult more than 3000 tax treaties that became
effective before 2013 and around 300 accompanying protocols.
We obtain data on bilateral inward FDI stocks between 2005 and 2012 from the UNC-
TAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) database and we invert
them to measure the investment from the home to the host country. In presence of FDI
diversion via a third country, we would ideally want to observe the indirect investment
from the home to the host country via the conduit country. However, the available data
reports only the immediate home to host country FDI stocks. Therefore, we can estimate
only the impact of DTTs on these immediate home to host country FDI stocks.5 Finally,
the information on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) is from the Investment Policy Hub
of UNCTAD.
4If under the tax treaty between country A and country B dividends are subject to a withholding tax
rate that is equal to the withholding rate under domestic law, any change in the domestic rate affects
directly the rate under the tax treaty.
5FDI data present one additional challenge: whereas our measure of tax distance consists of the cost of
channeling corporate income from one country to another in terms of taxes to be paid, firms may use debt
financing instead of dividend. To the extent that FDI stocks include debt financing, the relationship between
FDI stocks and tax distance becomes weaker and we are less likely to find significant results. Moreover,
as DTTs do not create tax liabilities, they cannot increase the tax cost of debt financing. Therefore, the
identification of relevant tax treaties is not biased by including tax treaties that leave investor worse off.
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4.2 Network analysis
Recent contributions by Van ’t Riet and Lejour (2017) and Hong (2017) employ a network
approach to study the centrality of countries in the tax treaties network and, respectively,
the structure of tax-minimising (direct and indirect) investment routes. Both studies anal-
yse the tax treaties network for a single year and ignore any changes in the tax treaties
network over time. Moreover, both studies use an adapted Floyd-Warshall shortest path
algorithm to estimate these tax-minimising investment routes, thereby overestimating the
potential for tax treaty shopping.6
We take a different approach and develop a Visual Basic Application (VBA) tool to
recalculate the tax distance for every possible combination of host, home and intermediate
countries.7 In this way, we can take into account the actual taxes paid in the jurisdiction
before the one receiving the dividends - typically the intermediate jurisdiction - instead
of nominal or world-average corporate tax rates. The single limitation of our approach
is that we assume and restrict the number of possible intermediate jurisdictions to two
in order to avoid long computation time of the analysis. However, this may not be an
unrealistic assumption as Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) show that only 0.2% of German
multinational firms use cross-border group structures with three or more pass-through
entities. Moreover, when we analyse our network using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm
(allowing for an unlimited number of conduits) we do not find any indirect connection
with three or more intermediate jurisdictions that would further reduce the tax distance
between any two countries in our sample. Thus, we believe that our approach is superior
to the Floyd-Warshall algorithm and allows for a more accurate network analysis.
For every year, we update the tax treaties network with all relevant changes. In partic-
ular, we account for changes in the provisions of tax treaties through amending protocols;
for changes in the provisions of the tax treaties through changes under domestic law (for
tax treaties that refer to conditions under domestic law); we add new tax treaties that
become effective; and remove tax treaties that have been terminated or replaced by new
ones in the course of the year being analysed. We assume a fully owned subsidiary engaged
in an active course of business and consider only domestic anti-abuse provisions.8 Specifi-
6The Floyd-Warshall algorithm calculates total taxes over the indirect route taking into account only
the nominal taxes in the intermediate jurisdictions. Assume that the home country relieves double taxation
through the indirect credit method, whereas the intermediate jurisdiction exempts foreign dividends. Under
the Floyd-Warshall algorithm, the home country credits the underlying corporate tax at the full nominal
tax rate. However, the actual tax rate on the dividends in the intermediate jurisdiction is 0%. Van ’t Riet
and Lejour (2017) tackle this problem by substituting the nominal corporate tax rate in any intermediate
jurisdiction with a worldwide average corporate tax rate.
7VBA is an implementation of Microsoft’s programming language Visual Basic 6 and it is built into
most Microsoft Office applications, including Microsoft Excel.
8Assuming a subsidiary engaged in an active course of business allows us to ignore potential anti-abuse
provisions targeted against treaty shopping. While this presents a limitation, the significant differences
in the subjective and objective scope of these provisions make it fairly impossible to treat them in a
systematic way. Moreover, whereas the OECD has put an effort in combating treaty shopping, its actions
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cally, we account for higher withholding taxes upon dividends distributions to tax havens
and subject-to-a-minimum-tax clauses.
Several countries in our sample levy a higher withholding tax on dividends when these
are distributed to a parent located in a tax haven. Because most of the domestic tax
havens lists are not comprehensive, we adopt a common tax haven list for all countries in
our sample across the entire time period (Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009).9 In accordance with
the majority of these domestic provisions, we exclude the anti-abuse treatment when a DTT
is in place. Similarly, several countries in our sample adapt a subject-to-a-minimum-tax
clause as a condition for claiming the benefits of participation exemption and exemption
from withholding tax on dividends.10 Since we observe to what corporate tax rates the
subsidiary and the parent company are subject to, we can easily control for this condition.
We describe the entire international network of double tax treaties with six variables.
Our first variable is a dummy that verifies if a DTT between two countries is present,
Treaty. This is the standard variable used in the previous literature. For every year in our
sample, we then measure the direct tax distance between any two countries taking into
account a possible tax treaty between these two countries, DistanceDirect. The innovative
element in our analysis is to identify if there exists an indirect route along which the tax
distance would be reduced as opposed to the direct route.11 For example, in 2012, a
South African parent company investing directly in a US subsidiary has to pay 5% tax on
distribution of dividends after considering the tax treaty between both countries. However,
if the same investment is made through a conduit company in the Netherlands the tax cost
can be reduced to 0%.
Once we estimate the minimum direct and indirect tax cost between any two countries,
we identify the relevance of tax treaties. For this purpose, we distinguish between three
types of tax treaties. First, we define relevant tax treaties as tax treaties that offer investors
a financial advantage over the conditions under domestic law, given the entire existing
tax treaties network. For example, in the year 2012, ignoring the bilateral tax treaty,
and recommendations are only recent and later than our sample years (see for instance OECD, 2015).
Finally, the effectiveness of anti-treaty shopping rules proves disputable, as shown in the joined cases
Deister Holding and Juhler Holding where the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the German
provisions as not compatible with the EU freedom of establishment. To the extent that we overestimate
the potential for treaty shopping, we are less likely fo find an effect of tax treaties and our results should
be interpreted as the lower bound.
9Our sample includes the following tax havens listed in Table 1 in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009): Aruba,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Botswana, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau,
Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Panama, Seychelles, Singapore, Switzerland, Uruguay, U.S. Virgin
Islands.
10Note that this differs from a subject to a tax condition. Here, we assume that all companies are subject
to tax.
11This implies looking at 144 different routes with a single conduit for each of our 146 home countries to
each of our host countries, and 144 times 143 different routes for two conduits, effectively comparing 440
million cases.
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the tax distance between Argentina as the home state and Belgium as the host state is
25% under the domestic law of both countries. The lowest possible tax distance when
channelling income through the network is 12.5%.12 Hence, ceteris paribus, we expect the
MNE to choose the indirect route over the direct one. However, the tax treaty between
Argentina and Belgium reduces the direct tax distance to approximately 1.5%, taking
away the advantage of the indirect route, and further reducing the minimum tax distance
between Argentina and Belgium by 11 percentage points. Therefore, the tax treaty is
relevant. We expect relevant tax treaties to increase the immediate home to host country
FDI. In theory, relevant tax treaties should stimulate FDI between two countries for two
reasons. On the extensive margin, firms may relocate investments from the indirect route
to the direct route or invest directly where they did not invest via a conduit company
despite its tax benefit in absence of the DTT. Along the intensive margin, firms would also
benefit from a lower overall tax burden, and this should increase FDI.
Second, we define neutral tax treaties as tax treaties that cut the tax cost of the direct
route to the minimum one in the network. Consider Japan as the home state and Canada as
the host state. In 2012, the direct tax distance between the two countries is 25% under their
domestic law. The shortest tax distance through the network is only 5%. Thus, the indirect
route is tax-preferred. Nevertheless, the bilateral DTT between the two states lowers the
direct tax distance to 5%, making the MNE tax-indifferent between the two investment
channels. Presuming non-negligible non-tax costs to treaty shopping, neutral tax treaties
may increase FDI between the home and the host state if firms relocate investments from
the indirect route to the direct route.13 This effect occurs only on the extensive margin.
Third, the group of irrelevant tax treaties consists of DTTs that do not change the
tax-preference of the indirect route. In the case of Argentina as the home country and
Germany as the host state, in 2012, the direct tax distance between the two countries
is about 26.4% under their domestic law, while the minimum tax distance through the
network is 12.5%. Thus, also in this case, we expect the MNE to tax-prefer the indirect
route rather than the direct one. Further, the DTT between the two countries reduces the
direct tax distance to 21.25%, which is still higher than the minimum tax distance through
the network. As a result, the tax treaty between Argentina and Germany is irrelevant to
the MNE’s decision to invest via a third country. Taken together, the relevant, neutral and
irrelevant DTT dummies add up to Treaty.
Given the minimum tax distance under domestic law and through the network, we
measure by how much a relevant DTT reduces the shortest route between two countries.
12One of the possible indirect routes is through the United Kingdom and Bolivia: the tax distance
between Belgium and the UK is 0% (no withholding tax in Belgium and participation exemption in the
UK)and so is the the tax distance between the UK and Bolivia (no withholding tax in the UK, while foreign
dividends are not subject to tax in Bolivia). Finally, the tax distance between Bolivia and Argentina is
12.5% resulting in an overall cost of 12.5%.
13Non-tax cost of treaty shopping may consist of the costs of setting up the intermediate company or the
higher risks associated with tax planning.
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We label this variable TreatyBenefit. Take China as the home country and Austria as
the host state. In 2012, the tax distance under domestic law of both countries is 25%.
The minimum tax distance through the network is also 25%. The DTT reduces the direct
tax distance to 7% giving a tax benefit of 18%. Compared to the fortuitous benefit of
treaty shopping, TreatyBenefit measures the intended reduction in taxation by the treaty
signatories. Consequently, we expect a positive effect of TreatyBenefit on the immediate
home to host country FDI.
TreatyBenefit measures tax benefits in an international setting. MNEs face a complex
investment decision and the choice for the appropriate investment channel depends on other
non-tax factors as well. In particular, we do not claim that MNEs will always invest along
the tax-preferred path. In this regard, TreatyBenefit captures the opportunity cost of not
using the tax treaty relative to the other investment route. The higher the TreatyBenefit
the higher the relative tax cost of investing indirectly from home to host country and the
more immediate home to host country FDI is expected. Obviously, TreatyBenefit is zero
in the case of irrelevant and neutral DTTs.
4.3 Summary statistics
Our sample consists of 138 countries in 2005 and 2006, 142 countries in 2007 and 2008 and
146 countries for the years 2009 - 2012.14 This corresponds to 18,906 unique country pairs
in the first year of our sample and 21,170 unique country pairs in the last year.15 Due to
missing economic data, the econometric analysis covers only 133 countries.
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the international tax network. In 2005, 12
out of 138 countries apply no unilateral method of double tax relief; 7 countries the deduc-
tion method; 37 offer direct credit; 13 use indirect credit; and the remaining 69 countries
exempt foreign dividend income. Ignoring bilateral DTTs, about 10% of all country pairs
are left with no relief; less than 6% deduct foreign taxes from the taxable income; approx-
imately 29% credit the host withholding tax from the domestic tax liability; almost 11%
credit also the underlying corporate tax; and slightly more than 44% apply the exemption
method. Once we include bilateral tax treaties, the shares of no relief and deduction drop
to approximately 9% for the former and 5% for the latter; the percentage of countries using
the direct credit method remains stable around 29%; indirect credits’ share raises above
11%; while the use of exemption method increases the most to more than 45%.
In terms of the cheapest connection on route, we observe that for more than 55%
of all country pairs the direct connection is the cheapest one. Further, 35% achieve the
minimum tax distance on an indirect route with one conduit company and 9% on an
14Due to missing domestic tax data we have to exclude from the network analysis Algeria, Cambodia,
Laos and Libya between 2005 and 2008; and Belarus, Madagascar, Montenegro and Serbia in 2005 and
2006.
15Note that the tax distance between two countries can be asymmetric, i.e. it is more expensive to
distribute dividends from country A to country B than vice versa.
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Table 1: International tax network
2005 2012
Number of countries: 138 146
Number unique country pairs: 18,906 21,170
Unilateral methods of double tax relief: no relief 12 13
deduction 7 7
direct credit 37 35
indirect credit 13 14
exemption 69 77
Bilateral taxation (in absence of DTTs): no relief 10% 11%
deduction 6% 5.5%
direct credit 29% 27%
indirect credit 11% 10%
exemption 44% 46.5%
Bilateral taxation (in presence of DTTs): no relief 9% 10%
deduction 5% 5%
direct credit 29% 27.5%
indirect credit 11.5% 10.5%
exemption 45.5% 47%
Shortest distance: direct 55% 52.5%
one conduit 35% 36.5%
two conduits 10% 11%
Number of zero tax distance connections: 6,780 9,116
Share of zero tax connections: direct 51% 47%
one conduit 42% 43%
two conduits 7% 10%
Number of country-pairs with an effective tax treaty: 3,439 4,539
Number of effective tax treaties per type: relevant 321 356
neutral 439 732
irrelevant 2,679 3,451
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indirect route with two conduits. Overall, 6,780 out of 18,906 unique country pairs have a
zero tax distance, where there are no repatriation taxes on distributed income. Corporate
income is taxed thus only once, at the level of the subsidiary, and there is no economic
double taxation.16 Almost 51% of the zero tax distance connections occur on the direct
connection, more than 41% on an indirect route with one intermediate country and the
remaining 7.4% on an indirect route with two intermediates.
In 2005, 3,439 country pairs have an effective DTT.17 Out of these, 321 country pairs
have a relevant tax treaty to the extent that it tax prefers the direct over the indirect route;
439 have a neutral tax treaty that cuts the direct tax cost to the level of the minimum tax
distance in the network; leaving the remaining 2,679 country pairs with an irrelevant tax
treaty.
Moving to the last year in our sample, 2012, 13 out of 146 countries have no unilateral
method of double tax relief; 7 countries apply the deduction method; 35 offer direct credit
for host withholding taxes; 14 credit also the underlying corporate tax, while 77 countries
exempt foreign dividends. Leaving again the effect of tax treaties aside, about 11% of
all country pairs have no relief for foreign taxes; 5.5% use deduction as the only relief
method; 27% apply direct credit; approximately 10% offer indirect credit; and 46.5% apply
exemption. Taking into account bilateral DTTs, the share of the no relief method drops
below 10% and that of the deduction method below 5%. At the same time, the shares of all
other methods increase to 27.5% in the case of direct credit; 10.5% in the case of indirect
credit; and 47.3% for the exemption method.
Focusing again on the cheapest connections in the network, we see that now only 52.5%
of the cheapest connections occurs on the direct route. This suggests that treaty shopping
has gained in importance over the last decade. The use of indirect routes with one conduit
company increases to above 36%, whereas indirect routes with two conduits increases to
almost 11%. Overall, 9,116 out of 21,170 country pairs have a zero tax distance. Among
these, 4,289 country pairs have a direct tax distance of 0%; 3,941 country pairs have a zero
tax distance on an indirect route with one intermediate country; while the remaining 886
zero tax distances are achieved on an indirect route with two intermediates. Finally, in
2012, 4,539 country pairs have an effective DTT. 356 of them are relevant, 732 are neutral
and 3,451 are irrelevant.
Figure 1 describes the economic consequences of treaty shopping. On the horizontal
axis, we plot for every single observation in our panel the direct tax distance in the absence
of treaty shopping, DistanceDirect. On the vertical axis, we show effective taxes paid if
instead an indirect route via one or two conduits is chosen. Points along the diagonal
exhibit no gains of treaty shopping. All countries were the direct distance is the cheapest
route will be along this line. The greater the vertical distance from the diagonal, the
bigger the saving due to treaty shopping. We show ample possibilities for treaty shopping,
16Note that the same outcome is achieved under the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
17The effective date of tax treaties can differ between the two signatory countries. This explains the
uneven number of effective DTTs.
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Figure 1: Potential gains from treaty shopping
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in many cases reducing the actual tax burden to zero.
Figure 1 reveals two interesting patterns. We find a series of vertical lines, which
typically reflect individual country pairs, where neither domestic tax regulation nor the
DTT have changed, and hence the tax burden along the direct route remains unchanged.
However, subsequent treaties signed with or between third countries have reduced the
tax burden along the indirect route, demonstrating how the international DTT network
undermines national policy. We also observe that a great deal of our observations occurs
along the 5%, 10% and 15% effective tax rates, which reflect the withholding tax rates
usually agreed on in DTTs. Under the exemption system applied by the majority of
countries in our sample, the actual tax burden is brought back from the level of domestic
withholding tax rates to these common treaty withholding tax rates. Moreover, a significant
number of observations is concentrated along the 25%, 30% and 35% direct tax distance,
which coincides with the corporate tax rates of many counties. These points comprise all
instances where the home country unilaterally offers a foreign tax credit - thereby setting
the direct tax distance equal to the domestic corporate tax rate - but the MNEs benefit
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable n Mean S.D. Min Max
FDI stocks (in US dollars) 34,233 3586.61 20605.24 0 592273.2
BIT 162,536 0.1759 0.3807 0 1
Treaty 162,5362 0.1975 0.3981 0 1
DistanceDirect 162,536 0.1805 0.1393 0 .78
RelevantTreaty 162,536 0.0166 0.1278 0 1
NeutralTreaty 162,536 0.0283 0.1659 0 1
IrrelevantTreaty 162,536 0.1526 0.3596 0 1
TreatyBenefit 162,536 0.0019 0.0181 0 0.35
from tax treaties with a more generous method of double tax relief.
Table 2 gives an overview of the summary statistics.
5 Estimation methodology and main results
The standard procedure to infer DTT effects on bilateral FDI flows employs a gravity
model and accounts for the presence of a DTT with a dummy variable equal to 1 when
a tax treaty is effective between two countries in year t and 0 otherwise. We include
the variables derived from the network analysis and adopt a Poisson estimator (Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood Estimation - PPML). We resort to the PPML estimator as proposed
by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to account for zero FDI flows and, more importantly,
heteroskedasticity in FDI data. In particular, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that
the standard log-linear OLS approach results in inconsistent coefficient estimates. Mainly
because of doubts about the exclusion restriction (Anderson & Yotov, 2016), we decide
not to follow the formal model of selection proposed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008). Given the large number of fixed effects, we use the ppml panel sg STATA command
(Larch, Wanner, Yotov, & Zylkin, 2017) and estimate the following equation:
(11)FDIps,t = exp[β1Tsp,t + β2Dsp,t + β3Xsp,t + ηs,t + θp,t + γsp] + s,t
where Tsp,t is a vector of tax rates or tax differentials, composed of DistanceDirect and
TreatyBenefit ; Dsp,t is a vector of dummies that describe the international tax network,
consisting of Treaty, RelevantTreaty, NeutralTreaty and IrrelevantTreaty ; and Xsp,t is a
vector of control variables, in our case only BIT . Finally, ηs,t and θp,t denote the time-
varying host-country, respectively home-country fixed effects, γsp captures country-pair
fixed effects and s,t is the Poisson error term. If the dependent variable is in levels, the
coefficient can be interpreted analogous to a log-linear estimation. A unit increase in the
regressor will lead to a 100(eβ − 1) percentage increase in the dependent variable.
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Time varying, host- and home-country fixed effects control for the multilateral resis-
tances as well as the economic mass of both countries. Similarly to Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) and Anderson and Yotov (2016), we use country-pair fixed effects, as described
by Wooldridge (2002), to address DTT endogeneity and control for the physical distance
between the host and the home country.
In presence of FDI diversion via a third country, the bilateral FDI flows are not inde-
pendent of each other. For a given capital stock, the availability of a shorter (cheaper)
indirect route leads to lower FDI flows on the direct route and vice versa. Ideally, we want
to observe what fraction of bilateral FDI flows is diverted via a conduit country to an
ultimate host destination. However, the available FDI data do not allow for that degree
of identification. Instead, we cluster our standard errors by total inward FDI of the host
country.
We present our main results in Table 3. First, we replicate results of prior literature
in column (1), using just a BIT and a Treaty dummy, as well as the direct tax distance to
measure the tax burden on FDI, alongside our host, home, and country-pair-fixed effects.
All variables are statistically insignificant, and given the previous literature, this comes as
no surprise.
The results change dramatically once we replace the Treaty dummy with our measures
of relevance in column (2). Whilst the variables of the previous specification (1) remain
insignificant, we now observe several interesting effects. The results of the three dummies
derived from the network analysis reveal a more complex mechanism behind the effects
of tax treaties on bilateral FDI. Whereas the simplified Treaty dummy did not have a
statistically significant effect on bilateral FDI, this effect differs among relevant, neutral
and irrelevant tax treaties. In particular, relevant and neutral DTTs exhibit a statistically
significant and positive effect on bilateral FDI, whereas irrelevant tax treaties have no
statistically significant effect. A switch to a relevant treaty will lead to 16.2% increase in
FDI. Note that the coefficient on neutral treaties is smaller than on relevent treaties as
expected, but this difference is statistically insignificant.
We extend the model in column (3) and add the TreatyBenefit variable in order to dis-
entangle the effects of relevant DTTs on the extensive and intensive margin. The extensive
margin should capture shifts of foreign direct investment from indirect routes to the now
cheaper direct route. The intensive margin should capture an increase in FDI as the tax
burden has been lowered. Whereas TreatyBenefit is not statistically significant, relevant
tax treaties continue to show a statistically significant and positive effect on bilateral FDI.
On first sight, this result suggest that firms do not react to a reduction in taxes along the
intensive margin, but relevant tax treaties increase FDI on the extensive margin.
However, we allow for a non-linear tax effect and add squared TreatyBenefit term,
TreatyBenefit2, in column (4). We find that the linear effect is small, negative, and signif-
icant at the 10% level, but the square term is positive and significant. This implies that
investors do not react to small gains in taxation, but that large tax reductions can indeed
lead to more FDI on the intensive margin.
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The total impact of a relevant treaty now depends on a combination of three factors,
RelevantTreaty, TreatyBenefit, and TreatyBenefit2. A relevant treaty with almost no treaty
benefit leads to a 22% increase in direct FDI on its own, due to the extensive margin. As
the treaty benefit increases, the negative linear and the positive square term offest each
other for low treaty benefits. Once the treaty benefit reaches a critical level around 15%,
a relevant treaty starts to foster FDI along the intensive margin. For the maximum treaty
benefit in our sample (35%) the increase in FDI would be 174%. These numbers indicate
that relevant tax treaties have a significant economic impact.
Overall, we believe that our results shed light on the empirically mixed results in
prior literature. Specifically, we are confident that our results highlight the importance of
recognising the international tax system as a network and allowing for distinct effects of
tax treaties through distinguishing their position in the network.
Table 3: Regression results: effects of double tax treaties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BIT -0.0116
(0.0777)
-0.0093
(0.0756)
-0.0074
(0.0758)
-0.0077
(0.0764)
Treaty 0.0642
(0.0556)
DistanceDirect 0.0415
(0.2153)
0.2227
(0.2339)
0.2642
(0.2445)
0.2828
(0.2441)
RelevantTreaty 0.1502**
(0.0636)
0.1173*
(0.0656)
0.2040***
(0.0795)
NeutralTreaty 0.1310**
(0.0643)
0.1381**
(0.0658)
0.1426**
(0.0660)
IrrelevantTreaty 0.0447
(0.0558)
0.0463
(0.0558)
0.0489
(0.0558)
TreatyBenefit 0.3234
(0.2892)
-1.8785*
(1.1269)
TreatyBenefit2 8.9603**
(4.2687)
Observations 32,785 32,785 32,785 32,785
Home-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9925 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924
Note: Dependent variable: FDI (2005-2012). Robust clustered (by
total inward FDI of the host country) standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
confidence level.
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6 Robustness tests
Tables 4 to 7 report several robustness checks to gain additional insights and confirm our
main results.
In Table 4, we add two further variables to our analysis. We create a dummy variable
that indicates if an indirect route exhibits a shorter tax distance than the direct route,
labeled NetworkConnection. The use of a conduit obviously identifies treaty shopping
and this is irrespective of a potential DTT between the home and the host country. If
the indirect route is the cheapest one, we measure the reduction in the tax burden due to
treaty shopping, NetworkBenefit. Similarly to TreatyBenefit, also NetworkBenefit measures
the tax benefit in an international setting. Hence, NetworkBenefit can be interpreted as
the opportunity cost of the not using the tax-preferred indirect path relative to a direct
investment. A positive and significant coefficient on NetworkConnection could actually
be interpreted in this fashion: the higher the NetworkBenefit the higher the relative tax
cost of investing directly from home to host country. If firms react by relocating their
investment via a conduit company, we expect the bilateral FDI to decrease with the size
of this benefit.
We extend each of our models (1) to (4) with the two network variables. The significant
and negative coefficient of NetworkConnection in column (1) suggests that country-pairs
with a cheaper indirect route have less immediate home to host country bilateral FDI.
However, this effect is not longer significant once we differentiate between the three types
of DTTs in columns (2) to (4). All of our main variables continue to show the same
significance levels as before.
It may come as a surprise that the variables summarising the network do not turn out
significant. However, since NetworkConnection measures the within country-pair variation
over time due to a change in the shortest investment channel from a direct route to an
indirect one, it captures just the opposite effect of our relevant and neutral dummies, but
independent of a country-pair having a DTT or not. With this variable turning insignificant
once we account for the heterogeneous impact of tax treaties, we can actually confirm that
the FDI increases due to relevant and neutral DTTs. Firms do not disinvest once an
indirect route becomes cheaper, but increase investment following a relevant or neutral
DTT. The fact that NetworkBenefit also turns out insignificant may be due to inertia, as
the optimal route may change often, whereas firms will not tax optimise on a yearly basis.
Tables 5, 6 and 7 reproduce each time the reduced model presented in Table 3 column
(2) in column (1) and the full model presented in Table 3 column (4) in column (3) for
the ease of comparing the results. We conduct our initial tests clustering the standard
errors by total inward FDI of the host country to address the concern that bilateral FDI
flows are not independent between the country-pairs. Table 5, columns (2) and (5) show
that clustering by total outward FDI of the home country yields fairly identical results.
Whereas clustering by total outward FDI addresses our concern of dependent FDI flows
between the country pairs, this is not true for clustering by country-pair. Nevertheless,
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we present those results in columns (3) and (6) and confirm our main conclusions: only
relevant and neutral tax treaties increase FDI.
Because the PPML estimator does not allow for negative values of FDI stocks, we
treat these observations as missing in our main model. Whilst negative FDI flows are
economically meaningful and represent disinvestments in the host economy, negative FDI
stocks are generally the consequence of accounting methods (Gouel, Guimbard, & Laborde,
2012). We confirm our results replacing the negative FDI stocks with a zero in Table 6
columns (2) and (5).
As pointed out by Cheng and Wall (2005), “Fixed-effects estimations are sometimes
criticised when applied to data pooled over consecutive years on the grounds that dependent
and independent variables cannot fully adjust in a single year’s time.” (p.8). To address
this concern, we follow Anderson and Yotov (2016) and estimate our model using only the
years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011, which is comparable to the 3-years interval in Trefler
(1993). We present these results in Table 6, columns (3) and (6). We again confirm that
relevant DTTs increase FDI in the full model.
In all of our baseline estimations we follow the standard practice in the empirical
literature on the effects of DTTs and use FDI stocks as the dependent variable. In case
there were a lot of inertia in foreign direct investment, changes in the treaty network might
only affect new FDI, suggesting to use FDI flows instead. We do this by including lagged
FDI as a dependent variable in Table 6. In particular, we add one-year lagged FDI in
columns (3) and (6) of Table 7 and continue to show robust results.
As explained by Braun and Weichenrieder (2015), firms may invest in tax havens not
only because of low tax rates, but also for non-tax reasons, such as secrecy. Schjeldrup
(2016) provides complementary reasons for the demand for secrecy by multinational enter-
prises. However, as pointed out by Van ’t Riet and Lejour (2017) tax havens are not crucial
in treaty shopping structures. Moreover, our set of time-varying host- and home-country
fixed effects should capture any unobservable reasons to invest in tax haven jurisdictions.
To confirm that our results are not biased by the presence of tax havens, we conduct a
separate analysis excluding all tax havens, except when the EU Parent-Subsidairy Direc-
tive applies or the country-pair has a DTT. We present the results in Table 7, columns (3)
and (6). Except for neutral DTTs, our full model shows significant results for all our main
variables. On the whole, we conclude that our findings are robust to the presence of tax
havens.
7 Conclusions
This paper has contributed to the literature on the effects of taxes on foreign direct invest-
ment. Despite the growing number of contributions, the empirical evidence on the effects
of double tax treaties on bilateral FDI so far has been inconclusive. This paper provides
evidence that this can be because many tax treaties are irrelevant. In order to avoid high
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host country withholding taxes on outgoing passive income, many multinational companies
divert FDI via a third country with a more favourable tax treaty. Nevertheless, the vast
majority of the existing literature treats DTTs as a binary variable, thereby ignoring their
complexity and their domestic and international interactions. Our study addresses this gap
in the literature and analyses the effects of double tax treaties allowing for treaty shopping
and for a differential effect of DTTs. We identify DTTs as relevant if they reduce the
overall tax burden below the one under domestic law and below the minimum one in the
network. We define as irrelevant a DTT that would not provide investors with a financial
benefit. We also include neutral DTTs that cut the tax costs of the direct route to the
minimum one in the network.
In line with the previous literature, we find that the direct tax distance has no impact
on bilateral FDI, defined as investment that does not run through intermediate countries,
but goes directly from the resident to the source state. We contribute to the literature
by asserting that this may be due to a strong presence of treaty shopping. Indeed, only
relevant and neutral DTTs will increase bilateral FDI, whereas we observe no effect of
irrelevant DTTs on FDI. Further, significant tax reductions due to treaty benefits will lead
to an increase in FDI.
We demonstrated that the presence of a cheaper indirect route to channel foreign direct
investment indeed exhibits a significant negative impact on direct foreign investment. Tax
treaties can only impact foreign investment if they reduce the tax burden with respect to
the existing global network of double tax treaties, i.e when they are relevant. Any treaty
between third countries can affect the relevance of a national treaty network, which implies
that countries loose some of their capabilities to set tax policy.
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Table 4: Network variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BIT -0.0092
(0.0775)
-0.0093
(0.0755)
-0.0076
(0.0756)
-0.0071
(0.0763)
Treaty 0.0580
(0.0553)
DistanceDirect 0.0632
(0.2869)
0.0863
(0.3324)
0.1586
(0.3694)
0.2015
(0.3701)
RelevantTreaty 0.1489**
(0.0639)
0.1214*
(0.0661)
0.2091***
(0.0804)
NeutralTreaty 0.1451**
(0.0738)
0.1481**
(0.0742)
0.1546**
(0.0745)
IrrelevantTreaty 0.0452
(0.0555)
0.0464
(0.0555)
0.0498
(0.0556)
TreatyBenefit 0.2784
(0.3185)
-1.8927*
(1.1285)
TreatyBenefit2 8.8823**
(4.2645)
NetworkConnection -0.0689*
(0.0369)
0.0079
(0.0501)
0.0068
(0.0500)
0.0100
(0.0500)
NetworkBenefit 0.3393
(0.3183)
0.2093
(0.3386)
0.1489
(0.3589)
0.0994
(0.3584)
Observations 32,785 32,785 32,785 32,785
Home-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924
Note: Dependent variable: FDI (2005-2012). Robust clustered (by
total inward FDI of the host country) standard errors in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence
level.
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Table 5: Standard errors clustered by total host inward FDI: (1) and (4); total home
outward FDI: (2) and (5); and country-pair: (3) and (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BIT -0.0093
(0.0756)
-0.0093
(0.0634)
-0.0093
(0.0941)
-0.0077
(0.0764)
-0.0077
(0.0641)
-0.0077
(0.0949)
DistanceDirect 0.2227
(0.2339)
0.2227
(0.2467)
0.2227
(0.3406)
0.2828
(0.2441)
0.2828
(0.2483)
0.2828
(0.3543)
RelevantTreaty 0.1502**
(0.0636)
0.1502**
(0.0680)
0.1502*
(0.0770)
0.2040***
(0.0795)
0.2040***
(0.0706)
0.2040**
(0.1029)
NeutralTreaty 0.1310**
(0.0643)
0.1310*
(0.0688)
0.1310**
(0.0654)
0.1426**
(0.0660)
0.1426**
(0.0707)
0.1426**
(0.0668)
IrrelevantTreaty 0.0447
(0.0558)
0.0447
(0.0639)
0.0447
(0.0694)
0.0489
(0.0558)
0.0489
(0.0643)
0.0489
(0.0695)
TreatyBenefit -1.8785*
(1.1269)
-1.8785*
(0.9522)
-1.8785
(1.4449)
TreatyBenefit2 8.9603**
(4.2687)
8.9603**
(3.8035)
8.9603
(5.6522)
Observations 32,785 32,785 32,785 32,785 32,785 32,785
Home-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924 0.9924
Note: Dependent variable: FDI (2005-2012). Robust clustered (by total inward FDI of the
host country) standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent confidence level.
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Table 6: FDI sample zero (2) and (5); and Intervals (3) and (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BIT -0.0093
(0.0756)
0.0115
(0.0759)
0.0348
(0.1017)
-0.0077
(0.0764)
0.0136
(0.0766)
0.0318
(0.1026)
DistanceDirect 0.2227
(0.2339)
0.2232
(0.2333)
-0.1282
(0.3316)
0.2828
(0.2441)
0.2858
(0.2435)
-0.0508
(0.3479)
RelevantTreaty 0.1502**
(0.0636)
0.1523**
(0.0635)
0.1168
(0.1041)
0.2040***
(0.0795)
0.1941**
(0.0802)
0.2874**
(0.1126)
NeutralTreaty 0.1310**
(0.0643)
0.1325**
(0.0643)
0.1228
(0.0902)
0.1426**
(0.0660)
0.1447**
(0.0659)
0.1409
(0.0928)
IrrelevantTreaty 0.0447
(0.0558)
0.0469
(0.0558)
0.0328
(0.0872)
0.0489
(0.0558)
0.0514
(0.0558)
0.0424
(0.0874)
TreatyBenefit -1.8785*
(1.1269)
-1.6038
(1.1472)
-4.0853***
(1.0631)
TreatyBenefit2 8.9603**
(4.2687)
7.9633*
(4.3570)
17.3020***
(3.8079)
Observations 32,785 33,455 15,665 32,785 33,455 15,665
Home-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9924 0.9924 0.9929 0.9924 0.9924 0.9930
Note: Dependent variable: FDI (2005-2012). Robust clustered (by total inward FDI of the
host country) standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent confidence level.
24
Table 7: Lagged FDI (2) and (5); and Tax Havens (3) and (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BIT -0.0093
(0.0756)
-0.0261
(0.0787)
-0.0135
(0.0769)
-0.0077
(0.0764)
-0.0232
(0.0794)
-0.0121
(0.0779)
DistanceDirect 0.2227
(0.2339)
0.3822
(0.2368)
0.0577
(0.2768)
0.2828
(0.2441)
0.4584*
(0.2443)
0.1802
(0.2873)
RelevantTreaty 0.1502**
(0.0636)
0.1771**
(0.0724)
0.0738
(0.0741)
0.2040***
(0.0795)
0.1778**
(0.0833)
0.1389*
(0.0853)
NeutralTreaty 0.1310**
(0.0643)
0.1576**
(0.0728)
0.0696
(0.0700)
0.1426**
(0.0660)
0.1696**
(0.0743)
0.0854
(0.0710)
IrrelevantTreaty 0.0447
(0.0558)
0.0594
(0.0613)
-0.0561
(0.0640)
0.0489
(0.0558)
0.0614
(0.0613)
-0.0498
(0.0638)
TreatyBenefit -1.8785*
(1.1269)
-1.2344
(1.0988)
-1.9429*
(1.0219)
TreatyBenefit2 8.9603**
(4.2687)
7.2942*
(4.1239)
9.0451**
(3.8754)
LagFDI 1.32e-06***
(3.01e-07)
1.34e-06***
(2.98e-07)
Observations 32,785 27,074 25,890 32,785 27,074 25,890
Home-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9924 0.9935 0.9929 0.9924 0.9935 0.9930
Note: Dependent variable: FDI (2005-2012). Robust clustered (by total inward FDI of the host
country) standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent confidence level.
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